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I. INTRODUCTION
There is no gentle way to put this: people all over the world are per-
ishing upon the altar of the failed ideology of market fundamentalism. So
says the 2001 Nobel laureate in Economics, Joseph E. Stiglitz, in Global-
ization and Its Discontents.' This brand of market fundamentalism,
* Steven A. Ramirez is a Professor of Law at the Washburn University School of Law
and the Director of the Washburn Business and Transactional Law Center.
1. Stiglitz writes:
Modern high-tech warfare is designed to remove physical contact: dropping bombs
from 50,000 feet ensures that one does not "feel" what one does. Modern economic
management is similar: from one's luxury hotel, one can callously impose policies
about which one would think twice if one knew the people whose lives one was de-
stroying.
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 24 (2002).
Stiglitz notes that "despite repeated promises of poverty reduction... poverty has actu-
ally increased by almost 100 million" persons over the last decade. Id. at 5. Global poverty is a
compelling mortal sin of the current western economic order, as 2.8 billion world citizens
struggle to live on less than two dollars a day. Id. at 25. Professor Stiglitz's book has been
widely reviewed in the business press and other media, but this is the only review that applies
the book's lessons to the field of law and economics. See, e.g., Barry Eichengreen, The Glob-
alization Wars: An Economist Reports from the Frontlines, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2002, at
157, 164 ("Stiglitz's book makes a compelling case that simple-minded economic doctrine,
inadequately tailored to the realities of developing countries, can do more harm than good, and
that the subtleties of economic theory are actually quite important for sound policy advice.");
Benjamin M. Friedman, Globalization: Stiglitz's Case, N.Y. REV. BKS., Aug. 15, 2002, at 48
("It is shocking to most citizens of the industrialized Western democracies to realize that in
Uganda, or Ethiopia, or Malawi, neither men nor women can expect to live even to the age of
forty-five. Or that in Sierra Leone 28 percent of all children die before reaching their fifth
birthday."); Michael J. Mandel, Where Global Markets Are Going Wrong, Bus. WEEK, June
Michigan Journal of International Law
emphasizing free markets, or market liberalization, and minimal gov-
ernment intervention in the economy, is the direct spawn of the
efficiency obsession that dominates law and economics. Stiglitz contends
that a broader, more comprehensive law and economics, one which fo-
cuses on organizing government intervention to support macroeconomic
growth as well as market efficiency is what is needed to set globalization
right) Stiglitz challenges lawyers to create legal and institutional frame-
works to facilitate a more successful globalization than that which has
emerged under market fundamentalism. 3 Basically, the call is to restruc-
ture the legal and regulatory foundation of globalization to better reflect
the teachings of economic science as opposed to free market ideology.
Institutions need to be restructured to be more democratic and more
resistant to special interest influences. Constituencies that have little
power or voice in globalization need to be heard in order to assure a
more nuanced, culturally sensitive and politically sustainable set of
globalization policies. States that are exposed to full globalization must
have adequate social, physical, and regulatory infrastructure in place to
allow markets to thrive to the maximum extent possible. Most
importantly, the world appears to be woefully undereducating its human
resources, and the law must respond with institutions that support this
key determinate of macroeconomic growth. Virtually all of Stiglitz's
17, 2002, at 17 ("[J]ust as [Milton] Friedman's book [Capitalism and Freedom] helped to
legitimize certain pro-market ideas before they became popular, so may Globalization and Its
Discontents give additional weight to a new conception of globalization. That would be no
small accomplishment.").
2. "The analytic propositions are clear: whenever there is imperfect information or
markets (that is always), there are in principle interventions by the government-even a gov-
ernment that suffers from the same imperfections of information-which can increase the
markets' efficiency." STIGLITZ, supra note I, at 219.
3. Stiglitz asserts:
I believe that globalization can be reshaped to realize its potential for good and I be-
lieve that the international economic institutions can be reshaped in ways that will
help insure that this is accomplished. But to understand how these institutions
should be reshaped, we need to understand better why they have failed, and failed
so miserably.
Id. at 215.
Stiglitz refers to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World
Trade Organization (WTO), as the "international economic institutions." Id. at 10-16. This
Book Review utilizes the same terminology.
4. Id. at 250 ("The free market ideology should be replaced with analyses based on
economic science, with a more balanced view of the role of government drawn from an under-
standing of both market and government failures."). Stiglitz particularly emphasizes the need
for appropriate regulatory infrastructure to support global markets-including adequate finan-
cial sector regulation, strong corporate governance standards, fair bankruptcy procedures,
substantial social safety nets, and even environmental regulation-all in the name of superior
macroeconomic growth and stability. Id. at 81, 139, 220, 233, 226-40.
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proposed economic reforms need legal structures to be fully realized.
This Book Review concludes that in order to adequately respond to
Stiglitz's recent book, legal scholars must expand their economic
horizons beyond mere laissez-faire efficiency to include macroeconomic
perspectives. Broadening the economic scope of this field would not
only coherently address the concerns arising from globalization in
particular, but also address the intersection of law and economics
generally with respect to both global and domestic issues of economic
structure.
Professor Stiglitz is a compelling expert witness on the shortcomings
of the legal and regulatory framework supporting globalization. Of
course his Nobel Prize grants him credentials beyond cavil. Stiglitz also
served on the Council of Economic Advisers from 1993 to 1997, ulti-
mately as its Chair, during the Clinton administration.5 From there,
Professor Stiglitz went on to serve as Chief Economist at the World
Bank from 1997 to 2000.6 At bottom, Stiglitz, as could be expected of
anyone educated in economics, is generally a proponent of free markets
as well as globalization.7 Nevertheless, while at the World Bank, Stiglitz
simply saw too much suffering on a first hand basis to ignore the short-
comings of the free market ideology that now dominates globalization.
He was there during the East Asian financial crisis of 1997, a shock to
the world economy that threatened even the United States.8 He was there
in 1998 when Russia imploded. 9 He was witness to the exercise of spe-
cial interest influence and can speak authoritatively to its impact on
policy.0 With all of Stiglitz's experience, it would be difficult to find a
better expert eyewitness to testify on why globalization has gone "horri-
bly wrong.""
5. Id. at ix, 25.
6. Id. at ix.
7. Stiglitz explains, "I believe that globalization-the removal of barriers to free trade
and the closer integration of national economies-can be a force for good and that it has the
potential to enrich everyone in the world, particularly the poor." Id.
8. Id. at 6, 89.
9. Id. at 133-65.
10. Id. at 173-76 (recounting the U.S. government's role in the creation of a worldwide
aluminum cartel designed to restrict output and raise prices, despite the determination by the
head of the Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, that the government may have broken
U.S. antitrust laws by participating).
11. Id. at 4. Recent events, too, support Stiglitz's indictment of globalization. Global-
ization and Its Discontents went to press before the Brazilian economy slumped in late
summer of 2002, resulting in the largest IMF bail-out in history. "For the IMF, Latin Amer-
ica's current plight is the latest disaster in a litany of emerging-market crises over the past
decade [that have] deeply dented the organization's credibility as a font of good economic
advice." Doubts Inside the Barricades, ECONOMIST, Sept. 28, 2002, at 63-64.
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How horribly wrong has globalization gone? According to Stiglitz,
the travails and tribulations of globalization amount to the greatest eco-
nomic disturbances since the Great Depression. 2 It was during this era
that the world learned that laissez-faire efficiency was an economic dead
end. 3 The Great Depression was a compelling circumstance for policy-
makers to begin to experiment with how government can act to make a
market economy work better.'4 It was exhibit A in the case against pure
market efficiency. The failed free market ideology of globalization is
exhibit B. It shows that merely allowing free markets to run amok is
"bad economics" at best." The question posed in the wake of yet another
free market fiasco, is how lawyers can design institutions and regulatory
authorities in a manner that facilitates market efficiency and macroeco-
nomic growth. In many ways, it is 1933 all over again.'6 If there is one
major difference, it is that today we know so much more. Today, we have
Joseph Stiglitz and other economists to tell lawyers why the international
economic system is so dysfunctional, and to challenge lawyers to design
a more durable and productive international infrastructure for global
capitalism."
12. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 89.
13. Id. at 74 (stating that globalization amounts to a "resuscitation of the laissez-faire
policies that were popular ... in the nineteenth century" and that "in the aftermath of the
Great Depression and the recognition of other failings of the market system, from massive
inequality to unlivable cities marred by pollution and urban decay, these free market policies
have been widely rejected in the more advanced industrialized countries").
14. Id. at 55.
15. Id. at xiii.
16. Stiglitz recalls:
The current situation reminds me of the world some seventy years ago. As the
world plunged into the Great Depression, advocates of the free market said, "not to
worry; markets are self-regulating, and given time economic prosperity will re-
sume." Never mind the misery of those whose lives were destroyed waiting for this
so-called eventuality. [John Maynard] Keynes argued that markets are not self-
correcting, or not at least in a relevant time frame. (As he famously put it, "In the
long run we are all dead.") Unemployment could persist for years, and government
intervention was required.... Today the system of capitalism is at a crossroads just
as it was in the Great Depression.
Id. at 249 (quoting JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACK ON MONETARY REFORM (1924)).
17. Thus far most legal scholarship addressing the world economic order has focused
on how to encourage the world economic institutions to take account of other noneconomic
considerations such as distributive justice, human rights, and social development. See Enrique
Carrasco, Critical Issues Facing the Bretton Woods System: Can the IME World Bank and
GA7T/WTO Promote an Enabling Environment for Social Development?, 6 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS., at i (1996). Even recent scholarship specifically addressing the structure
and relationship of the world economic institutions has had little to say about how to create
macroeconomically optimized institutions and structures. Deborah E. Siegel, LegalAspects of
the IMF/WTO Relationship: The Fund's Articles of Agreement and the WTO Agreements, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 561 (2002). Obviously, these noneconomic considerations are very important
[Vol. 24:831
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II. GLOBALIZATION AND THE FAILED IDEOLOGY OF
MARKET FUNDAMENTALISM
A set of ideological policy proscriptions that Stiglitz terms the
"Washington Consensus" dominates the economic globalization that has
marked the last fifty years of world economic development." According
to Stiglitz, there is broad consensus among the U.S. Treasury, the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund that the right policies for de-
veloping countries can be derived from "the free market mantra" that
gripped Washington in the 1980s.' 9 This free market mantra means an
extremely limited role for government intervention in the economy of
developing nations. It also means that industry should always be privat-
ized as rapidly as possible, with little exception. Finally, this extreme
adherence to market fundamentalism means that free markets should
reign supreme: trade barriers should always be eliminated immediately,
and capital markets should be fully liberalized. 20 All of this may sound
just fine, particularly to avid readers of American law reviews which are
dominated by scholars espousing this same brand of market fundamen-
talism under the auspices of the law and economics movement. Stiglitz,
however, shows how this philosophy led to disaster in the context of the
globalization efforts of the past few decades.'
issues separate and apart from their economic implications; however, this Book Review is
limited to economic issues.
18. Other economists have also identified problems associated with what Professor
Stiglitz refers to as the market fundamentalism of the Washington Consensus. For example,
Professor Jagdish Bhagwati uses the term "The Wall Street-Treasury Complex" to refer to the
free market ideology pushed by special interests on Wall Street and their agents that populate
the U.S. Treasury as well as the IMF and the World Bank. JAGDISH BHAGWATI, THE WIND OF
THE HUNDRED DAYS: How WASHINGTON MISMANAGED GLOBALIZATION 8-9 (2000).
19. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 16.
20. Id. at 59.
21. Law and economics is a varied and dynamic approach to legal issues. This Book
Review only addresses the laissez-faire enthusiasts among law and economics scholars, who
employ law and economics to seemingly always conclude that government intervention in the
economy is unnecessary, without any consideration of macroeconomic analysis or how legal
frameworks and institutions can support strong markets. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669,
714 (1984) (arguing that markets provide incentives for disclosure and therefore there is no
need for securities regulation); Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A
Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1358 (1983) (invoking law
and economics in support of the conclusion that "New Deal labor legislation is in large meas-
ure a mistake"); Jonathan R. Macey & Elizabeth H. Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors:
A Summary of the Theoretical and Empirical Arguments, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 215, 239 (1988)
("[Micro]economic theory suggests that depositors exposed to risk of loss will discipline ex-
cessively risky banks ... through contractual devices[,] ... higher risk premiums and ...
withdrawals" and therefore there is little need for government-sponsored deposit insurance);
see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (5th ed. 1998) (stating that
Spring 20031
Michigan Journal of International Law
According to Stiglitz, the IMF-and to a lesser extent other interna-
tional financial institutions-has imposed extreme fiscal austerity upon
the developing world, resulting in severe limitations on the ability of
governments to provide basic services and economic infrastructure. The
"IMF/market fundamentalist model" essentially holds that "if govern-
ment was not the root of all evil, it certainly was more part of the
problem than the solution."22 This approach is a throwback to the laissez-
faire policies of a bygone era, one plagued by gross inequality, poverty,
and macroeconomic instability. After the Great Depression, this brand of
market fundamentalism was roundly rejected throughout the economi-
cally advanced nations of the world.23 According to Stiglitz, the IMF,
however, adheres to an ideological position that has little to do with
modern economics; one that mandates extreme optimism in the function-
ing of markets, and extreme pessimism in the functioning of
24government.
economic analysis of law is about "rational choice" and not about "mysterious macroeco-
nomic phenomena" like inflation, growth, output, or unemployment).
Judge Posner recognizes that laissez-faire is associated with those who seek efficiency
outcomes in the law. Id. at 27 ("It would not be surprising to find that many legal doctrines
rest on inarticulate gropings toward efficiency, especially since so many legal doctrines date
back to the nineteenth century when a laissez-faire ideology based on classical economics was
the dominant ideology of the educated classes."). Ironically, Stiglitz considers many of these
government interventions to be central elements of the institutional infrastructure needed to
facilitate the growth and stability of a market-based economy. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 81,
139.
22. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 85. Recently, there has been a growing recognition that
the Great Depression was triggered by policies relating to the gold standard that acted to cre-
ate a global contractionary bias. See generally PETER TEMIN, LESSONS FROM THE GREAT
DEPRESSION 38 (1989). Ultimately, the IMF may assume this same role, as chief propagator of
contractionary policies, when the global economy needs just the opposite. How To Rescue It,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 28, 2002, at 11-12 (stating that the world is desperately in need of eco-
nomic stimulus).
23. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 74, 249 (noting that laissez-faire policies do not work,
and that the onset of government management of macroeconomic performance has resulted in
fewer and shorter downturns and longer expansions). Even though Nobel-prize winning
economists such as Stiglitz recognize the folly of laissez-faire law and economics, Judge Pos-
ner mentions laissez-faire only once, as associated with efficiency, and makes no mention of
the hazards of laissez-faire policies to macroeconomic performance. POSNER, supra note 21, at
27,785.
24. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 85. Judge Posner asserts that most all statutory and ad-
ministrative law is inefficient. POSNER, supra note 21, at 569 ("The list of inefficient rules
discussed in this book could be extended enormously, to cover much of the nation's statute
law and administrative regulation."). One reason for this skepticism is because law and eco-
nomics generally views regulation and legislation as products purchased by special interests.
Id. at 572-75. This view ignores the fact that important economic regulation, such as the Fed-
eral Reserve Board's administration of monetary policy, has been secured from the pernicious
influence of special interests. Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 503, 504-05 (2000).
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Here, Stiglitz speaks with particular authority. He shared the 2001
Nobel Prize with George Akerlof and Michael Spence, specifically for
his work regarding the inability of markets to function according to
conventional theory under conditions of information asymmetry.25 As
Stiglitz states: "markets do not work perfectly, in the way that simplistic
models which assume perfect competition and perfect information claim
they do.,26 "One of the great achievements of modern economics is to
show" that markets operate efficiently only under "highly restrictive"
conditions. 7 Recent learning has "shown that whenever information is
imperfect ... which is to say always ... then the invisible hand works
most imperfectly."28 Thus, government intervention is frequently needed
to help markets operate more efficiently and to assist in creating
conditions conducive to economic growth. 9 Nevertheless, the teaching of
modern economics had little effect upon the IMF, which was, according
to Stiglitz, motivated by a "curious blend of ideology and bad
economics, dogma that sometimes seemed to be thinly veiling special
interests."'
The absurdity of the IMF's policies would be comedic if not accom-
panied by immense human suffering and the massive destruction of
human capital. For example, the IMF refused to bail out Thailand in the
late 1990s unless the government slashed social spending. The resulting
cuts in health care expenditures and education investments caused prosti-
tution and AIDS to soar.' In other developing countries the IMF insisted
that food and fuel subsidies be cut, or that nations eliminate free school-
ing and instead impose fees to recover the costs of education.32 Such a
"trickle down" approach to growth, where it is hoped that efficient mar-
kets alone will ultimately raise all boats, has been specifically rejected in
developed countries like the United States.33 More importantly, such
policies do not create conditions conducive to economic growth, as so-
cial instability and an ill-educated workforce can make economic
progress impossible.34 Such policies, therefore, not only fail to secure a
25. The best summary of the related work of the 2001 Nobel laureates is on the Nobel
Prize website, http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/2001/public.html.
26. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at xi.
27. Id. at 73.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 73-74, 82-83.
30. Id. at xiii.
31. Id. at 80.
32. Id. at 20.
33. Id. at 79-80.
34. Id. at 218, 219 (stating that East Asian growth was in part attributable to universal
and high quality educational investments and that "[s]ocial cohesion is important if an econ-
omy is to function: urban violence in Latin America and civil strife in Africa create
environments that are hostile to investment and growth").
Spring 20031
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globalized economy that functions to create additional demand for
American exports, but are morally wrong and hypocritical.
The next pillar of the Washington Consensus is rapid privatization of
industries. 35 "The rhetoric of market fundamentalism asserts that privati-
zation will reduce what economists call the 'rent-seeking' activity of
government officials who either skim off the profits of government en-
terprises or award contracts and jobs to their friends. 36 Stiglitz rightfully
points out that government generally has no business running what ought
to be private enterprises. 7 Indeed, the central lesson of the collapse of
the communist bloc is that centralized economic planning, where gov-
ernment makes decisions that are best made by markets, is doomed to
failure.38 Governments cannot possibly process all of the information that
is impounded into market decisions, and therefore economic distortions
are inevitable anytime markets are supplanted by government decision
makers. Without profit motives and private property, economic perform-
ance is compromised. 39 All of this is uncontested by Stiglitz and other
economists. The IMF, however, was not just theoretically in support of
privatization; it extended its market fundamentalist theory behind priva-
tization to ideological extremes. Thus, the IMF pushed rapid
privatization, known as shock therapy, requiring premature privatization
and maintaining scorecards tallying the number of industries that a na-
tion had privatized, as if privatization was an end in itself.
40
Again, market fundamentalism alone proved to be an incomplete
basis for policy. For example, while privatization could well oust rent-
seeking officials from positions of power, if those same officials are put
in charge of privatization, unencumbered by appropriate legal and
regulatory frameworks, then the process could devolve into
"briberization""' Basically, privatization can transform rent-seeking
The compelling economic logic of creating a social infrastructure conducive to invest-
ment and growth has been specifically rejected by law and economics theorists. For example,
Judge Posner specifically recognizes that poverty reduction would lead to decreases in crimi-
nal activity, as the opportunity costs of crime increased. Nevertheless, rather than propose real
improvements in social infrastructure, Posner theorizes that a more egalitarian society may
have higher crime, because it would be easier to fence goods in more common use and would
cost more to protect unconcentrated wealth. POSNER, supra note 21, at 242-43. Such facile
speculation avoids the need to confront the reality that the macroeconomic growth that Stiglitz
associates with social infrastructure could greatly outweigh these de mininlus costs.
35. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 53.
36. Id. at 58.
37. Id. at 54.
38. Id. at 141.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 180-81.
41. Id. at 58 (stating that the free marketeers "failed to realize that without the appro-
priate legal structures and market institutions, the new owners might have an incentive to strip
assets").
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officials into wholesale agents of corruption. With privatization they are
not limited to an annual skim. Rather, they are empowered to realize the
value of the entire future flow of skim, and to appropriate those benefits
from subsequent office holders.42  The experience in the mass
privatization of the Russian economy is instructive on this point. Russia,
succumbing to the advocacy of the IMF and the U.S. Treasury, opted for
shock therapy.43 Thus, privatization proceeded rapidly, before any legal
framework existed to assure that assets were not merely stripped away
by the cronies of the ruling elite." Predictably enough, friends of
Russian President Boris Yeltsin were able to use their influence to strip
assets from Russian industry and secrete them abroad.4'5 As Stiglitz
reports: "An oligarch who has just been able to use political influence to
garner assets worth billions, after paying only a pittance, would naturally
want to get his money out of the country" or face potential political
pressure for the reversal of ill-gotten gains.46 Billions in capital flowed
out of Russia as a result.
41
"Briberization" is not the only malady implicit in rapid privatization.
Frequently, nations create enterprises specifically because the private
sector has failed to create viable markets.48 Developed nations know this
well, as it is a fundamental tenet of capitalism that government must step
into gaps in a market economy, which will naturally fail to exploit cost-
effective opportunities if no single actor can capture the benefits of a
given initiative or investment.40 Predictably, the ideological market fun-
damentalism of the IMF failed to account for this basic economic
reality.50 Many times when the IMF insisted upon privatization, govern-
ment provided services simply disappeared, whether involving phone
42. Id.
43. Id. at 140-43.
44. This underappreciation for regulatory infrastructure to protect investors is mirrored
in the law and economics literature. For example, Judge Posner has asserted that securities
regulation may be a "waste of time." POSNER, supra note 21, at 30.
45. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 159-60 (stating, "Yeltsin's friends and associates became
billionaires" and that Russia's new "oligarchs stole assets, [and] stripped them, leaving ...
enterprises... on the verge of bankruptcy, while they were enriched.").
46. Id. at 144.
47. Id. at 144-52 (citing CHRYSTIA FREELAND, THE SALE OF THE CENTURY: RUSSIA'S
WILD RIDE FROM COMMUNISM TO CAPITALISM (2000), stating that the Russian business elite
was corrupt and stole much of Russia's wealth).
48. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 55 (citing market failures to provide annuities and rea-
sonable home mortgages as leading to reforms in the United States for Social Security and
federally backed mortgage issuers).
49. E.g., ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 473 (Great Minds ed., 1991) (1776) (gov-
ernment is duty bound to provide "public institutions" and "public works" which may be in
the highest degree advantageous to a "great society" but which are not profitable to any indi-
vidual economic actor because benefits may be widely diffused).
50. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 55.
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service, transportation, or newborn chicks for farmers.' When govern-
ments exited these businesses, the services provided were simply
destroyed, along with the jobs that were created by the government en-
terprise.52 According to Stiglitz, privatization has thus failed to lead to
the growth expected, and has even contributed to economic decline.53
The final element of market fundamentalism is market liberaliza-
tion-meaning the removal of government interference in financial
markets and the removal of trade barriers.54 The theory behind financial
market liberalization is simple enough. Stripping away regulations de-
signed to impede the flow of capital would enhance the efficiency of
capital markets and allow markets to allocate capital in a way that en-
hances economic growth.55 Capital controls would invariably make it
harder for developing countries to attract foreign capital and invest-
ment." Thus, the IMF has pushed for more rapid financial market
liberalization as a condition for giving troubled developing nations assis-
tance everywhere and always. 7 Indeed, the U.S. Treasury has even
insisted, against the wishes of the U.S. Trade Representative, upon more
rapid financial market liberalization as a condition to entering into trade
liberalization agreements with trading heavyweights like China. Stiglitz
contends that the Treasury pursued market fundamentalism in financial
markets with a vengeance in order to mollify the special interests it is
beholden to on Wall Street.58 The promise of billions or even trillions of
dollars whizzing around the globe, from free capital market to free capi-
tal market, China included, was simply too much for Wall Street (and
indirectly the U.S. Treasury) to resist. The free marketeers ignored the
extraordinary risks of financial market deregulation.59
For example, there was no evidence showing that free capital mar-
kets would lead to greater investment in developing markets or to more
economic growth. The IMF's own studies showed that countries which
rejected financial market liberalization received the largest amounts of
foreign investment. Other studies showed that liberalization did not lead
to higher growth or higher investment. China demonstrated that capital
51. Id. at 54-56.
52. Id. at 59-60.
53. Id. at 58-59.
54. Id. at 59.
55. Id. at 66.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 62.
58. Id. at 63-64.
59. The skepticism of the law and economics movement toward virtually all govern-
ment intervention inspired the deregulation movement of the 1980s and the 1990s. This is the
identical ideological approach to government regulation that led globalization astray. See su-
pra text accompanying notes 21, 24.
[Vol. 24:831
Market Fundamentalism's New Fiasco
market liberalization did not impair a country's ability to attract capital,
and the East Asian countries showed that rapid growth could be fueled
through internal capital, if savings was sufficiently high.60 Thus, any
benefits of freeing up capital markets are theoretical at best.
On the other hand it is now widely accepted that financial market
liberalization entails a significant risk of amplifying global instability.
61
The problem is that free capital flows, unlike flows in goods and ser-
vices, have historically been characterized by "panics" and "manias. 62
According to Stiglitz there is now a wealth of data showing that financial
market liberalization leads to financial crises, like the one that afflicted
East Asia in 1997.63 Stiglitz believes that freeing up capital markets was
the single greatest factor giving rise to that fiasco.6' The East Asian crisis
illustrates the pitfalls of capital market liberalization. The East Asian
nations had achieved an unprecedented level of growth and poverty re-
duction during the three decades preceding the crisis." Investors, seeking
high returns, flocked to these economies, increasing capital flows to this
region by sevenfold over seven years.66 However, in 1997, investor sen-
timent shifted precipitously, as it is apt to do, in the face of attacks by
currency speculators on the Thai currency.67 As Thailand was crushed
under these pressures, investors began to flee liberalized capital markets,
first in Thailand and ultimately throughout the developing world, caus-
ing the contagion to spread from Thailand to Korea to Russia. 68 Stiglitz
characterizes the resulting wreckage as the "greatest economic crisis
since the Great Depression."69 In short, freeing up financial markets
means that "hot money" can flow rapidly into high growth areas, and
then flow rapidly out of economies that suffer any number of setbacks,
60. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 66-67.
61. Even the former deputy managing director of the IMF, Stanley Fischer, recently
disclosed in public that the IMF had underestimated the risks of financial crises in a world
with liberalized financial markets. BHAGWATI, supra note 18, at 8.
62. Id. at 4 (citing CHARLES KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES 220-21
(4th ed. 2000), stating that panics and crashes are realities that simplistic economic theories
like the efficient capital markets theory fail to explain).
63. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 99. "It is becoming conventional wisdom (and indeed
IMF policy) that countries that have not opened their financial systems.., such as China and
India, should do so slowly and cautiously" Doubts Inside the Barricades, supra note 11, at 65.
64. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 89.
65. Id. at 91.
66. Id. at 98; see also Doubts Inside the Barricades, supra note 11, at 64 (stating that
one of the "lessons" from capital market liberalization is that capital has a "tendency to pour
in when investors are confident, and flee just as suddenly").
67. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 94-95, 100 (citing JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GEN-
ERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 161-162 (Great Minds ed., 1991)
(1936), stating that investor sentiment is governed by "animal spirits").
68. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 94, 108.
69. Id. at 89.
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with either internal or external sources, leaving financial devastation in
its wake.7°
Perhaps the Washington Consensus stood on its strongest ground, in
terms of economics, in insisting that developing nations liberalize trade
restrictions-meaning lifting all barriers to trade. The theory of
comparative advantage holds that trading countries can each benefit by
producing goods where each enjoys a comparative productivity
advantage. Thus, trade allows a nation to move workers to their most
productive uses.7' Stiglitz, as is the case with most all economists, fully
accepts the benefits of free trade.72 He only contends that the benefits of
free trade have been greatly diminished by the way the Washington
Consensus has implemented trade liberalization.
For instance, Stiglitz maintains that the developed world-
particularly the United States-has pursued trade liberalization in a
hypocritical fashion. "The Western countries have pushed poor countries
to eliminate trade barriers, but kept up their own barriers, preventing
countries from exporting their agricultural products and so depriving
them of export income."73 The United States subsidizes its agriculture,
even though this is an industry where developing nations may well enjoy
a comparative advantage; yet, the United States insists upon market lib-
eralization for industrial products.74 Consequently, countries that remove
trade barriers expose their native industries to competition with the likes
of Coca-Cola, Pepsi, Unilever, and Citibank. Meanwhile in the United
States, developing countries must compete with U.S. agriculture backed
by massive government subsidies.75 Similar hypocrisy is evident from the
course of trade negotiations. In the most recent Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations, the United States was able to bargain for the elimination of
trade barriers in financial services and information technology, while
maintaining trade barriers for maritime and construction services. In
short, the United States seeks free trade in industries where it enjoys a
comparative advantage, and protectionism where the developing world
70. Id. at 7; see also Eichengreen, supra note I, at 159 ("[Mlost economists now agree
that Stiglitz's warnings about the dangers of precipitous financial deregulation were on the
mark.").
71. STIGLITZ, supra note I, at 59.
72. Id. at ix.
73. Id. at 6; see also Edmund L. Andrews, Rich Nations Are Criticized for Enforcing
Trade Barriers, N.Y. I)MES, Sept. 30, 2002, at A8 (quoting World Bank president James D.
Wolfensohn as chastising developed nations for "squandering" $1 billion a day on farm subsi-
dies to the detriment of the undeveloped world).
74. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 7; see also Andrews, supra note 73, at A8 (quoting for-
mer IMF deputy managing director as terming continued protectionism in the developed world
"scandalous").
75. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 68-69.
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may be able to compete. This explains why the World Bank has calcu-
lated that the poorest region in the world (Sub-Saharan Africa) actually
saw its income decline 2 percent as a result of the Uruguay Round of
trade negotiations.76 In sum, this final pillar of market fundamentalism
seems more designed to further enrich the United States at the expense
of the developing world.
How has the market fundamentalism pursued by the Washington
Consensus fared? The consensus is that it has not done well. Russia is an
example of how poorly the Washington Consensus has managed global-
ization. From the fall of communism in 1990 through 1999, industrial
production plunged 60 percent, and GDP plummeted 54 percent.7 Pov-
erty rose from 2 percent to over 23 percent. In East Asia, the former
economic powerhouses have been similarly humbled. Incomes in the
region are 20 percent lower than if growth had proceeded apace. 8 In the
Ukraine and in Russia, life expectancy is decreasing.79 Throughout the
eastern bloc, output has stagnated where it has not fallen precipitously.8 °
In Latin America, most economies are mired in stagnation, and Argen-
tina has endured double-digit unemployment since 1995.8 China, on the
other hand, averted the Asian contagion and has enjoyed remarkable
economic performance since embracing a market-based economy, spe-
cifically by adopting a program that was "directly opposite" to that
advocated by the Washington Consensus. 2
The failure of market fundamentalism comes as no surprise to
economists. At least since the Great Depression, the developed nations
have rejected the very laissez-faire policies foisted upon the developing
world under the auspices of market fundamentalism.83 Japan and the
United States both achieved rapid industrialization under the umbrella of
the very protectionism that the market fundamentalists denied to
developing nations.84 More recently, economists studying the so-called
Asian Miracle, which was the moniker for East Asian economic
performance before the IMF and its peculiar market fundamentalism
took root there, found that government action can create the legal
infrastructure to support growth.85 "While the Washington Consensus
76. Id. at 61.
77. Id. at 143.
78. Id. at 121.
79. Id. at 152.
80. Id. at 151-52.
81. Id. at 18.
82. Id. at 126.
83. Id. at 74.
84. Id. at 16-17.
85. Id. at 91 ("Though the experts' findings were toned down in the final published
report, the World Bank's Asian Miracle study laid out the important roles that the government
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policies emphasized a minimalist role for government, in East Asia,
governments helped shape and direct markets. 86 This raises the question
of what drove the Washington Consensus to pursue its agenda with such
zeal.
Stiglitz suggests that the dogmatic adherence to market fundamental-
ism has much to do with the sway special interests have had over the
process of globalization. Whether termed the "Washington Consensus" or
the "Wall Street-Treasury Complex" economists increasingly see the role
of special interests behind market fundamentalism.87 The legal structure of
the international economic institutions seem to be tailor-made for the ex-
ercise of special interest influence. The public, particularly in the
developed world that runs globalization, seems ill-equipped to fully
comprehend the issues raised by economic globalization. In the wake of
minimal public influence over the globalization process, powerful eco-
nomic interests with large stakes in the regulatory environment-here
Wall Street financial institutions and multinational corporations-can
appropriate inordinate sway over globalization issues through campaign
contributions, job prospects for top officials and lack of transparency in
decision making.89 Stiglitz shows that each of these factors is at play in
globalization. Robert Rubin, former U.S. Treasury Secretary, and Stanley
Fischer, former managing director of the IMF, both landed lucrative po-
sitions at Citibank after their stint in governing the process of
globalization.' Campaign contributions seemed to influence who ac-
companied Commerce Secretary Ron Brown on his trade missions to
open markets for U.S. firms. 9' The U.S. Treasury has certainly repre-
sented vigorously the interests of Wall Street firms and there is little
doubt that the globalization policies pursued by the United States reflect
the short-term interests of those firms. One example of this is the role the
IMF plays in bailing out nations close to default on Wall Street loans.
Another example is the issue of capital market liberalization.92 "Looking
at the IMF as if it were pursuing the interests of the financial community
had played [in creating an environment conducive to growth]. These were far from the mini-
malist roles beloved of the Washington Consensus."); see also BHAGWATI, supra note 18, at
357-58 (noting that growth in India in the 1950s was accompanied by government policies
relating to education, land reform, health care, and community development).
86. STIGLrrz, supra note 1, at 92.
87. Id. at 91-92; see also supra text accompanying notes 18, 30, 58.
88. This reviewer has previously outlined both the factors that allow an agency to resist
special interest influence, as well as the factors that militate in favor of greater depoliticization
of financial regulation. See Ramirez, supra note 24, at 553 ("[llmportant economic regulation
can be secured against the pernicious influences of special interests.").
89. Id. at 521-22, 591-93.
90. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 19.
91. Id. at 70.
92. Id. at 64, 207.
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provides a way of making sense of what might otherwise seem to be
contradictory and intellectually incoherent behaviors."93
Essentially, when the IMF releases funds to a distressed nation, the
funds are ultimately paid over to Wall Street investors who took advantage
of international lending opportunities, but who demand government
protection to safeguard them from the risks of those international
investments.94 Additionally, the IMF imposes conditions upon the release
of funds that require contractionary economic policies that effectively
ensure that the Wall Street investors who took advantage of market
liberalization can be repaid in currency that is not devalued.9 Stiglitz
suggests that the focus of globalization should be rationally recast from
protecting Western investors to stimulating real economic growth and
development.96 Thus recast, Stiglitz maintains that globalization can
achieve its macroeconomic promise once governments work in tandem
with free markets to regulate, manage, and supervise the evolution of the
macroeconomy. 97 It is time for the law to respond to the teachings of
economic science in a way that recognizes the limitations of markets, as
well as the power of markets. 98
III. THE LAW AND MACROECONOMICS OF JOSEPH STIGLITZ
Stiglitz asserts that the "most fundamental change that is required to
make globalization work" is to restructure the IMF and the World
Bank.99 The obstacles to such change are deep-seated. Stiglitz gives the
example of so-called cost-recovery programs for education expenditures,
whereby users of schools in developing countries absorb the costs of
education. The United States passed legislation requiring it to oppose
such measures. The U.S. executive director of the IMF simply ignored
93. Id. at 207. Other economists concur with Stiglitz's assessment of the need to insu-
late the global financial regulatory institutions from special interest influence. See
Eichengreen, supra note 1, at 164 ("The real problem is the politicization ... of the IMF's
economic advice" and the solution is a "depoliticize[d]" structure, akin to "the model of an
independent central bank.").
94. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 201.
95. Id. at 198-99 (stating that billions paid to troubled nations ultimately served to
enrich speculators).
96. Id. at 206-13 (stating that IMF policies make sense only if the aim of the policies
was to serve interests of the financial community, as opposed to fostering economic growth
and stability).
97. Id. at 21 (stating that in the United States "markets were not left to develop willy-
nilly" and that government "played a vital role in shaping the evolution of the economy").
98. Id. at xii-xiii (stating that market fundamentalism precludes the possibility of gov-
ernment interventions that spur economic growth and make everyone better off).
99. Id. at 226.
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the law and Congress did not even notice this behavior.'" Stiglitz argues
that such secrecy undermines democracy and empowers special inter-
ests.'0' Articulating a solution to the issues of transparency and openness
of the IMF, the WTO, and the World Bank is beyond the scope of this
Book Review, but the central point is that Stiglitz has presented a com-
pelling economic argument that lawyers must think about how to create
a global legal infrastructure to support a more open and transparent in-
ternational financial architecture. In other words, law and economics
needs to transcend mere free market ideology and offer real solutions to
the real problems facing economic globalization.
Similarly, the law must recognize that the transcendent importance
of the IMF and the World Bank, in terms of the power they wield and the
geographic expanse they rule, means that such institutions must answer
to far broader constituencies. First, consider the power of these institu-
tions. Over the past twenty-five years almost one hundred countries have
faced financial crises.' 2 When a nation faces economic disruptions there
is really only one place to turn for financial assistance: the IME' 3 In or-
der to get IMF funds countries must accept market fundamentalism's
proscriptions.' °4 Moreover, even if a nation does not seek IMF funds,
they still must submit to annual "consultations" that are thoroughgoing
evaluations of how well a nation is adhering to the tenets of market fun-
damentalism.'"5 A large country, like the United States, can afford to
ignore the IMF's assessments. A small nation, even a relatively devel-
oped one like South Korea, cannot afford to ignore the IMF. Globalized
markets would take such an act as a sign of economic risks, leading to a
higher cost of capital.' °6 Developing countries, therefore, have little
choice but to follow the free market dictates of the IMF.
The reach of these dictates places the Washington Consensus in a
position of assuming the role of global economic dictator. The IMF has
mandated cuts in food and fuel subsidies from Morocco to Indonesia.'
7
It has also pushed to have countries around the globe impose user fees
for public education.' In Russia, President Boris Yeltsin was encouraged
100. Id. at 51-52.
101. Id. at 227-29.
102. Id. at 15.
103. In fact, in the midst of the East Asian Crisis of 1997, Japan offered to fund the crea-
tion of an Asian Monetary Fund with a contribution of $100 billion. The United States, not
wanting any competition to its market fundamentalist policies essentially killed the idea. Id. at
112.
104. Id. at 12-16.
105. Id. at 48.
106. Id. at 42-43.
107. Id. at 20.
108. Id. at 51-52.
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to impose market reforms by decree, without going to the Duma for ap-
proval."° After the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, generic drug
manufacturing in India and Brazil was prohibited, causing critical drugs
to soar in price and effectively condemning thousands to death. °"0 All of
this power over virtually every aspect of life in developing nations is in
addition to the control imposed over fiscal and monetary policy in devel-
oping countries, as discussed above.' "[T]he IMF typically provides
funds only if countries engage in policies like cutting deficits, raising
taxes, or raising interest rates that lead to a contraction of the econ-
omy."" 2 There is seemingly no end to the power of the international
economic institutions and the Washington Consensus.
Such vast power is the result of mission creep, and was not origi-
nally within the contemplation of the creators of the world's
international financial architecture. The origins of the international eco-
nomic institutions lie in the economic ruin facing the world after World
War II. The United Nations convened an international economic confer-
ence in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 1944. This conference was
dominated by John Maynard Keynes and his particular economic view
known as Keynesianism. Conceptually, the central tenet of Keynesian-
ism, that government should act to counter economic downturns,
remains valid today."3 This was reflected in the mission contemplated for
the international economic institutions: they were to. act to stem eco-
nomic downturns from transforming into world downturns by assuring
that funds were available to stimulate economies before economic dis-
ruptions spread globally. ' 4 Stiglitz highlights how the IMF mission has
transmogrified over the decades since Bretton Woods:
[Tihe IMF has changed markedly. Founded on the belief that
markets often worked badly, it now champions market
supremacy with ideological fervor. Founded on the belief that
there is a need for international pressure on countries to have
more expansionary economic policies ... today the IMF
typically provides funds only if countries engage in policies ...
that lead to a contraction of the economy. Keynes would be
rolling over in his grave were he to see what has happened to his
child.'"
109. Id. at 136.
110. Id. at 8.
111. See supra text accompanying note 22.
112. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 12-13.
113. Id. at 11.
114. Id. at 12.
115. Id. at 12-13.
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Certainly, the international economic institutions were never in-
tended to be the high priests of the failed laissez-faire ideology.1 6 As
previously shown, laissez-faire policies have been widely discredited,
particularly at the time of the Bretton Woods conference. The economists
who designed the world's financial architecture at that conference did so
in the shadow of the Great Depression."7 "Not since Herbert Hoover
have responsible economists argued" in favor of the IMF's market fun-
damentalism programs."'
The reason why the international economic institutions pursue this
curious blend of "bad economics" that no developed nation would ever
follow seems to be best explained by the role of special interests." 9
Stiglitz believes that otherwise incoherent policies make sense if one
assumes that the Washington Consensus acts to further special inter-
ests."20 This is patent in the hypocrisy with which the Washington
Consensus pursues market fundamentalism. The developed countries
effectively deny developing countries the ability to use government in-
tervention to facilitate the operation of their market-based economies;
this despite the fact that virtually every country that has achieved eco-
nomic development has used government to enhance the operation of
their macroeconomy."2 ' Wall Street too, pursues policies of market fun-
damentalism for all but itself; it frequently seeks government
intervention on its behalf.'22 It wants the enhanced returns of interna-
tional lending, but demands that government shield it from the enhanced
risks of such lending.'23 Stiglitz makes a compelling case that special
interest influence has bollixed up globalization.
The law must respond by designing international economic institu-
tions that are resistant to special interest influence. In the domestic arena
more learning is emerging on the limitations of public choice theory,
which holds that regulation will be subverted from its public interest
goals to the service of special interests.'24 For example, the ability of the
116. Id. at 74.
117. Id. at 11.
118. Id. at 105-06.
119. Id. at xiii.
120. Id. at 216.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 23, 33, 62.
122. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 102.
123. Id. at 200-01. The IMF and the World Bank have finally indicated that it is inap-
propriate for the funds that they lend to be used to bail out Wall Street lenders. Consequently,
they are poised to propose a new sovereign bankruptcy regime that would relieve countries of
the full debt burden owed to Western banks, and would require lenders to renegotiate more
lenient repayment terms. Harry Dunphy, Financial Leaders Promise Action, AP ONLINE, Sept.
30, 2002, available at 2002 WL 101071637. This proposal tracks the recommendations that
Stiglitz makes on this point. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 237.
124. Ramirez, supra note 24, at 553-54; see also supra text accompanying note 88.
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Federal Reserve Board to manage monetary policy free from special in-
terest influence provides important lessons on how regulatory agencies
can be structured to resist such influence.'25 These lessons now need to
be extended to the international arena, and this role must involve lawyers
with an understanding of both the economic objectives of these agencies
and how the law can structure such agencies to best achieve that mission.
Quelling special interest influence is just one piece of the puzzle facing
lawyers that seek to implement the lessons learned from economists like
Stiglitz.
Stiglitz also posits that any economic program for growth, no matter
how sound, must also be socially and politically sustainable. As illus-
trated by Russia in 1917, and France in 1789, severe economic hardship
cannot be imposed upon a society without risking riot, revolution, or
widespread social disruption. Stiglitz shows that all too often the Wash-
ington Consensus pursues policies that lead to these very afflictions.'
26
According to Stiglitz "social capital" and the "social contract"-each of
which reflect the degree to which citizens stand behind an economic sys-
tem-matter to macroeconomic growth and stability.'27 Stiglitz suggests
that democratizing the international economic institutions can have posi-
tive effects on global economic development. Thus, any proposals for
reforming the international financial architecture must respond to the
need for broadening the governing base of these powerful and critical
international economic institutions. Right now, the international financial
architecture can only be termed a dictatorship of the rich and powerful.
Specifically, these organizations must be governed by more than just
trade and finance ministers of the developed world -generally, and the
United States in particular.'
28
Stiglitz also highlights the failure of legal and regulatory "infrastruc-
ture" as a key culprit underlying the failure of globalization.' 29 As he sees
it:
Old-fashioned economics textbooks often talk about market
economics as if it had three essential ingredients: prices, private
property, and profits. Together with competition these provide
125. Ramirez, supra note 24, at 591-93.
126. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 77, 119 (showing how strife and riots in Africa and East
Asia have set back economic development). According to at least one economist, the IMF now
understands that "reforms that do not produce growth will not be politically sustainable."
Eichengreen, supra note 1, at 161.
127. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 160-62, 209.
128. Id. at 12, 20.
129. Id. at 139. Economists use the term infrastructure to mean any public facility that
lowers the cost of capital or increases the return to private capital. See ROBERT J. GORDON,
MACROECONOMICS 331 (8th ed. 2001).
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incentives, coordinate economic decision making, ensuring firms
produce what individuals want at the lowest possible cost. But,
there has also long been a recognition of the importance of insti-
tutions. Most important are legal and regulatory frameworks, to
ensure that contracts are enforced, that there is an orderly way of
resolving commercial disputes, that when borrowers cannot re-
pay what is owed, there are orderly bankruptcy procedures, that
competition is maintained, and that banks that take depositors
are in a position to give the money back to depositors when they
ask. This framework of laws and agencies helps ensure that se-
curities markets operate in a fair manner, that managers do not
take advantage of shareholders nor majority shareholders of mi-
nority shareholders. In the nations with mature market
economies, the legal and regulatory frameworks have been built
up over a century and a half, in response to problems encoun-
tered in unfettered market capitalism. "0
For example, Stiglitz indicts the lack of a regulatory infrastructure
for permitting privatization to devolve into "briberization" because of a
lack of regulation and corporate governance standards.' He identifies
banking regulation and securities regulation as critical regulatory infra-
structure needed to support a developed market-based economy.1
3 2
According to Stiglitz, inadequate financial regulation, as pushed by the
deregulation mantra of the IMF, was a key factor leading to the East Asia
crisis.' In fact, financial sector deregulation has a miserable record in
the United States; commentators have linked both the savings and loan
debacle of the 1990s and the stock market debacle of 2000-2002 to pre-
cipitous deregulation in the financial sector.'34 Thus, any restructuring of
the world financial architecture must ensure that appropriate treaties and
130. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 139.
131. Id. at 220.
132. Id. at 183; see also Steven A. Ramirez, Fear and Social Capitalism: The Law and
Macroeconomics of Investor Confidence, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 31 (2002) (demonstrating that
optimized regulatory infrastructure designed to strengthen investor confidence stabilizes and
enhances macroeconomic performance).
133. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 81.
134. Id. at 64-65, 114; Carl M. Cannon, Suits vs. Suits: Learning to Love Those Legal
Leeches, FORBES, Oct. 7, 2002, at 18 (stating that in enacting broad securities law deregulation
"government wasn't doing its job."); Emily Thornton et al., The Breakdown in Banking, Bus.
WEEK, Oct. 7, 2002, at 40-42 (stating that deregulation of the financial services industry left
the industry riddled with conflicts and on a shaky financial foundation). Professor Stiglitz is
among the economists who blame excessive financial deregulation for the meltdown in inves-
tor confidence that struck American financial markets in the summer of 2002. See Joseph
Stiglitz, The Roaring Nineties, ATL. MONTHLY, Oct. 2002, at 75, 79-82 ("It is no coincidence
that three of the sectors involved in today's economic problems-finance, telecommunications
and electricity trading-were all subject to deregulation.").
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institutions are in place to assure that developing nations adopt appropri-
ate regulatory infrastructure to complement the regulatory infrastructure
already in place in the developed nations.'35 Amazingly, the IMF used its
influence to achieve the precise opposite result.'
36
Globalization has also suffered from a dearth of initiatives to secure
appropriate investments in human infrastructure. Stiglitz associates
growth with government policies that provide a high-quality education to
its citizens.3 7 In countries that have been most successful in achieving
economic growth, governments "provided high-quality education to
all.' 38 Consequently, educational investments are "win-win" policies
because they enhance both growth and equality. ' Powerful empirical
evidence supports this conclusion.' 40 Markets cannot provide adequate
funds for education because the full benefits of an educated citizenry are
so diffused throughout society. '4' To address this problem, developed
countries provide generous subsidies for education.14 Given all of this,
one would think the international economic institutions would support
educational investments. Instead, the IMF has actively worked to cut in-
vestments in education.'
43
Accordingly, the international economic institutions have
consistently shredded the world's economic infrastructure.'" Investments
in human capital were discouraged. 14 '5 Regulatory infrastructure was an
afterthought at best.'4 6 Social infrastructure was given little or no weight
in policy deliberations. '4 On the other hand, capital markets were opened
to exploitation by Wall Street interests. When loans went bad, the IMF
provided both funds for repayment to money center banks as well as
props to assure that repayment was made in currency that was not
subject to devaluation. Billions flowed to Wall Street, while third world
citizens were charged for the cost of education and left unemployed and
135. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 139.
136. Id. at 102-03.
137. Id. at 218.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 82.
140. Id. at 76.
141. See id. at 218.
142. Id. at 222.
143. Id. at 20.
144. Stiglitz's view that growth is associated with active government intervention in the
form of providing broad economic infrastructure is increasingly mainstream economic sci-
ence. E.g., WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH 289 (2001) (surveying
empirical evidence regarding growth issues in the tropics and concluding that growth occurs
when government policies foster growth by creating incentives to invest, providing education,
supporting the rule of law, and subsidizing the poor).
145. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 80.
146. Id. at 58.
147. Ramirez, supra note 24, at 503-05.
Spring 2003]
Michigan Journal of International Law
destitute. 4 ' Drug companies harvested billions in sales of patented drugs
while the IMF insisted that developing nations slash spending on health
care. 9 In the end, free market ideology failed to deliver again.5°
Issues of sovereignty cloud issues of legal structure for the
international financial architecture. Nevertheless, certain elements seem
clear. The IMF exercises too much power with too little accountability.
Perhaps the international economic institutions should be governed under
the auspices of the United Nations. The world economic institutions are
too prone to special interest influence. Perhaps limitations should be
imposed upon post-employment activities and senior officials should serve
longer terms of office. The IMF should exclusively pursue stimulatory
policies to stem local and regional downturns, and be forbidden from
imposing conditions that interfere with basic human rights of economic
actualization and autonomy."'' The World Bank should be required to
invest in growth and human capital in a depoliticized fashion. Countries
without adequate financial sector regulation should be barred from
participating in international finance. Are these suggestions sound? Can
they be implemented through treaties or under existing international
law? It is hard to say because there is a dearth of legal scholarship
addressing such concerns.' This is the problem with the current law and
economics movement. Its focus is too narrow. It is bounded by efficiency
and does not generally address how to create legal frameworks
conducive to macroeconomic stability and growth.'53  Stiglitz
convincingly shows that it is time for a new law and economics
approach. 1
54
148. STIGLIrZ, supra note I, at 80.
149. Id.
150. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 18, 121, 126, 143, 151-52.
151. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
arts. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
152. For example, Posner's law and economics text does not even mention the IMF, the
World Bank, or globalization. See POSNER, supra note 21, at 765-802.
153. As of late 2002, it is clear that there is little time to waste; indeed, the strong eco-
nomic conditions that prevailed in at least parts of the developed world during the 1990s may
some day be viewed as the last clear chance for global capitalism to set itself right. Now, the
world economic order is faced with plunging world equity markets and serious financial crises
in Brazil, Argentina, and Japan. Dunphy, supra note 123. In fact, one commentator has raised
the prospect that world financial leaders appear to be "asleep at the switch" Id.
154. Although Stiglitz's book has aroused controversy, little of that controversy applies
to his central economic message that laissez-faire, free market ideology is best left on the ash
heap of history. The great weight of Stiglitz's suggestions and analysis is well within tradi-
tional and mainstream economic science. Indeed, even the IMF now agrees with many of his
central points. See Thomas C. Dawson, Director, External Relations Department, International
Monetary Fund, Stiglitz, the IMF and Globalization: A Speech to the MIT Club of Washington,
Speech at the MIT Club of Washington (June 13, 2002), available at http://www.imf.org/
extemal/np/speeches/2002/061302.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2003) (stating that many of
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IV. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A NEW LAW AND ECONOMICS
In the end, Stiglitz (and his fellow economists) have issued a
challenge to lawyers to rethink the role of government in a modern
industrialized economy, and to provide legal structures to institutionalize
and rationalize government's role in managing the economy, both
domestically and internationally. The problem is that there is precious
little, learning on how to create legal structures to support
macroeconomic performance. The vacuum left by the narrow focus on
free market efficiency is being filled, increasingly, by economists like
Joseph Stiglitz, who are extending the learning of which structures
support the strongest macroeconomic performance the furthest. Stiglitz's
proposals show how critical the law is to enhancing macroeconomic
growth. He proposes sound financial market regulation such as deposit
insurance, securities regulation, and banking regulation. He proposes
that corporate governance standards be imposed to protect minority
shareholders and passive investors. He proposes that international
economic institutions be redesigned to allow more democratic control
and less special interest influence. He proposes that governments be
empowered to take measures to help markets work better and to provide
productive infrastructure. He proposes a new kind of bankruptcy law to
supplant IMF bailouts of money center banks. Finally, he proposes that
government always maintain the basic social contract that assures that
social infrastructure is in place to stem riots, unrest and political
disruptions to investment expectations. In short, he proposes many legal
innovations to support economic growth.
Meanwhile, the legal academy languishes in an obsessive and nar-
row focus on free market efficiency. The conventional learning on law
and economics results in essentially the very market fundamentalism that
Stiglitz and other economists hold is "bad economics" and ideologically
driven. Until the law and economics movement recognizes the limits of
free market doctrine, it will continue to lose touch with economic sci-
ence and will ultimately be best termed law and pseudo-economics.
Stiglitiz's central points are "broadly correct," "mainstream," and sometimes "read like pas-
sages from speeches by the IMF's Managing Director").
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